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“Putting mercy back in mercenary” became the slogan of Blackwater Worldwide1 after 
harsh criticism from the media tarnished their image. Blackwater is just one example of a private 
firm working for the US government. Since the establishment of the Continental Army in the 
17th century, the success of US military operations has relied on a healthy combination of 
soldiers and civilian support. Technological advancements in weaponry have demanded civilian 
support in development and manufacturing, while new strategic goals call for continued civilian 
support in protecting soldiers and reconstructing combat zones. The War in Iraq that began in 
2003 was, however, an atypical situation. For the first time, contractors were performing security 
functions for military men in an unstable environment (Elsea). In Iraq, private firms known as 
Private Security Contractors (PSCs) have served to protect individuals, transport convoys, 
forward operating bases and infrastructure, and train Iraqi military personnel (Elsea). Given the 
heightened reliance on PSCs from the Department of State and Department of Defense, the US 
government has taken on the burden of establishing regulations to govern their actions and hold 
them accountable. On September 16, 2007, Blackwater security personnel working for the State 
Department opened fire at Nisour Square2 in Baghdad killing 17 Iraqi civilians causing the 
effectiveness of US oversight to come into immediate question. How was the State Department 
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operating? What protocol was in place to prevent such an abuse of power, who established 
accountability, and where were the US supervisors? Prior to this incident, these questions had not 
received sufficient consideration. Instead, there was a lack of proper documentation, mass 
confusion over jurisdiction and the resulting lack of accountability, and a shortage of oversight 
personnel within the State Department. It appeared that PSCs working for the State Department 
were answerable to no one. This contributed to Iraqi hostility toward US presence and the 
perception that US personnel could commit abuses with no repercussions. As the Blackwater 
shooting and lack of State Department oversight exploded in the media, the United States was 
forced to respond. It became apparent that the United States had failed to provide adequate 
oversight for State Department private security contractors in Iraq, though recent steps have 
improved this oversight. 
As the American Revolution began to unfold, General George Washington recognized 
the need for civilian support in the Continental Army. The Continental Congress justified this 
relationship on the basis that civilians could accomplish menial tasks, allowing military men to 
concentrate on their wartime responsibilities. Acceptance of civilian logistical support rested on 
the common idea that noncombatants could perform tasks without coming into direct 
confrontation with the enemy (Toler). For General Washington, civilians performed tasks 
including food preparation, medical services, delivering letters, driving wagons and carpentry 
(Buhler). This initial role of civilians established a supportive function, meaning civilians were 
present to perform tasks that would otherwise detract from the focus of military men. A shift 
occurred during the Vietnam conflict. More than ever before, American civilians were present by 
the side of US soldiers, mainly because of advancements in equipment that required civilians to 
become “specialists in the tools of war”, particularly air warfare and the development of the 
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attack helicopter (Toler). During the Vietnam War, an estimated 735 private security companies 
deployed civilians compared to 76 companies in Desert Storm and 52 companies in Bosnia,3 but 
the need for civilian support continued to grow (Buhler). As the ratio of soldiers to civilians 
climbed, civilians not only performed supportive functions, but eventually were expected to 
provide security for the US military.4  
Though the practice of outsourcing security to civilians is not new to the US military, the 
War in Iraq presents an atypical situation. For the first time, civilian contractors are providing 
security in an unstable environment where the host country’s forces are deficient or absent 
(Elsea). Due to escalating Iraqi hostility toward US personnel, Iraq had become a volatile and 
extremely dangerous place. As a result, many PSCs were armed as they worked in Iraq due to 
increasing violence and the nature of their work.5 As the war entered the reconstruction stage,6 
PSCs continued to provide a vital role in providing security for military personnel while training 
Iraqi forces. It seems their job was never done. Despite US intentions to cut the number of 
contractors by 5% each quarter and employ Iraqis in their place as police officers or security 
guards, some contracted activities like training Iraqi forces and strategic communications were 
likely to increase as troops withdrew. It is held that “nowhere has outsourcing been larger or 
more contentious than in Iraq” (DeYoung). Iraq represents “the largest deployment of U.S. 
contractors in a military operation," with more than 100,000 PSCs present in Iraq in 2006 
(Merle).  
The Department of State has increasingly employed PSCs in the past twenty years to 
provide security for U.S. embassies around the world, the personnel and homes of those who 
staff these facilities, and any visitors. In 2004, the Department of State took over the 
responsibility from the military of providing security to the newly opened Embassy in Baghdad. 
Bernard 4 
 
A shortage of DS special agents forced the State to outsource manpower from the private sector 
resulting in a one year contract with Blackwater Worldwide to provide security services for the 
new Baghdad embassy. In the summer of 2005, the State Department began contracting bids 
under Worldwide Personal Protective Services (WWPS)7 which called for a five year contract 
(Elsea). Blackwater Worldwide was one of three companies8 to sign on. Under the WWPS 
contract, Blackwater’s primary area of operation was Baghdad (Elsea). With diplomats 
constantly traveling into and out of the capital city, PSCs received training in protecting convoys, 
guarding buildings, and responding to threats, but a new task emerged- protecting themselves 
from violent ambushes. Soon the area morphed into a constant combat zone.9 Striving for 
sovereignty and the end of US presence, some Iraqis were determined to get US personnel out 
and communicated this through violence in the capital.10 By the end of February 2007, the death 
toll in Baghdad as a result of violent attacks totaled 35,557 (Baghdad).  
On September 16, 2007, Blackwater personnel were guarding a convoy of three vehicles 
as they traveled through the center of Nisour Square to the nearest Green Zone11 approximately 
two miles away. As the vehicles continued through a traffic circle guarded by Blackwater teams 
known as Mambas, a car bomb exploded.12 Assuming that they were under attack, Blackwater 
guards opened fire. One bullet struck a young Iraqi man driving a car. As the car continued to 
roll forward, Blackwater personnel contended that another car bomb could conceivably be inside 
and continued to open fire in the area resulting in seventeen Iraqi deaths (DeFronzo). US 
Representative Tom Davis13 spoke of the incident before Congress saying: “Iraqis 
understandably resent our preaching about the rule of law when so visible an element of the U.S. 
presence there appears to be above the law. That is why the events of September 16th sparked 
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such an outcry by the Iraqi government which sees unpunished assaults on civilians as a threat to 
national sovereignty” (Elsea).  
The policy of Blackwater Worldwide was to respond to any assault with overwhelming 
firepower in order to eliminate any threat. The legality of this policy came into immediate 
question following the Baghdad shootings. Anne Tyrell, director of Blackwater USA public 
affairs, insisted that Blackwater personnel “responded well within the rules of engagement to 
protect the people” (Fireman). Chairman Erik Prince reiterated that the “Blackwater team acted 
appropriately while operating in a very complex war zone” (Raghavan). The debate that ensued, 
however, questioned the authority of Blackwater personnel as granted by the State Department. 
US military reports indicated that Blackwater guards opened fire without provocation and used 
excessive force against Iraqi civilians (Raghavan).  
The U.S. Embassy in Baghdad issued a Policy Directive for Armed PSCs in Iraq14 in 
May of 2008 to establish the rule of law consistent with the Memorandum of Agreement 
between the Department of Defense and Department of State signed on December 5, 2007.15 The 
directive advised PSCs to use deadly force only in matters of “self defense of others when there 
is a reasonable belief of imminent threat” and cautioned PSCs to gradually increase the level of 
force used before using lethal force. The directive applied to “all private security contractors 
working under any contract for the Department of State or federal agency under Chief of Mission 
authority” (U.S. Embassy). According to these existing rules of the US Embassy in Baghdad 
Policy Directive, Blackwater was clearly in violation according to US military reports that 
personnel opened fire without provocation. The US Embassy had previously established its 
policy on deadly force and how to approach situations using an escalating scale of force.16 
Blackwater, however, chose to ignore this directive and adopt its own that called for the use of 
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overwhelming force. In fact, Blackwater had engaged in 195 “escalation of force” incidents since 
2005, including over 160 incidents in which Blackwater fired first (Griffin). This tendency to 
open fire without provocation added to the controversy surrounding the Blackwater shooting.  
As the investigation of the Blackwater shooting in Baghdad continued to unfold, several 
questions emerged concerning how US prosecutors could pursue the case. In order to prosecute 
private contractors, the law that established accountability had to be identified. Typically, the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) applied to all military and contract personnel 
supporting the Department of Defense mission. Following a 2006 Amendment to the UCMJ, all 
civilian contractors could be charged under military jurisdiction during a “contingency 
operation” rather than the previous requirement that Congress actually declare war. Prior to this 
2006 Amendment, contractors working in Iraq were exempted from prosecution in that country 
(Fiske). The Amendment closed that gap by authorizing commanders to disarm, apprehend, and 
detain any DoD contractors suspected of committing a felony offense outside of their authorized 
mission. In other words, if contractors’ behavior constituted a crime and went beyond their 
official responsibilities, they could be detained and apprehended by their chain of command. 
Contractors found in violation were subject to the basic UCMJ pretrial process and procedures of 
court-martials. Though the UCMJ set clear guidelines for DoD personnel including PSCs, it 
could not govern over Department of State personnel, whose mission was completely separate 
from that of the DoD. 
 The Military Extraterritorial Act (MEJA)17 sought similar resolution as the 2006 UCMJ 
Amendment in permitting federal jurisdiction over felony offenses committed outside the United 
States by contractor personnel “of any federal agency or provisional authority whose 
employment relates to supporting the DoD mission.” The MEJA required coordination between 
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the DoD and Department of Justice for the return of contractor personnel to the US for 
prosecution (U.S. Laws). The language in the MEJA referencing support of the DoD mission 
again eliminated any relevance in prosecuting Blackwater personnel, who were working for the 
Department of State. 18 
Legislators then looked to Iraqi law in attempts to find some grounds holding DS 
contractors accountable. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), 19 created as a temporary 
administration until the establishment of a democratically elected government in Iraq, was an 
arm of the Department of Defense that executed laws in Iraq. In 2004, the United States 
government in Iraq issued Order 17 under the CPA which held contractors immune from Iraqi 
laws in instances pertaining to their contracts. Order 17 stated that contractors “shall not be 
subject to Iraqi laws or regulations in matters relating to the terms and conditions of their 
contracts, including licensing and registering employees, businesses and corporations.” Order 17 
remained in effect even after the CPA dissolved, extending contractors’ immunity to Iraqi law 
until January of 2009 when it was finally revoked (Griffin). 
 In response to these legal gray zones, The Wartime Contracting Commission, a 
Congressionally mandated effort to review the contracting process in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
examined how well the government was managing private contractors. In 2008, the Commission 
released its report stating that “the government lacks clear standards and policy on inherently 
governmental functions” and condemned the government and federal civilian workforces for not 
keeping pace with the growing number of contractors (Simons). As allegations deemed the State 
Department an “enabler” for contractor abuses, several Congressional efforts attempted to 
investigate this problem. In testimony before Congress, the Head of the State Department’s 
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Diplomatic Security Operations admitted that the extent to which those working under the State 
Department were within the jurisdiction of US civilian courts remained “murky” (Raghavan).  
 With virtually no laws establishing accountability for the State Department, a lack of 
records and proper documentation further complicated communication between the Department 
of State and the Department of Defense- two agencies that outsourced private contractors for 
security purposes. Because both agencies worked simultaneously in Iraq and represented the US 
government, effective communication, as provided by proper documentation sent between the 
two, was crucial to carrying out successful missions. It was not until the second half of 2007 that 
the Department of Defense began gathering data on the number of private contractors in Iraq and 
what role they played there. Even the authenticity of the numbers of contractors recorded and 
incidents reported were questionable after a Government Accountability Office report in 2008 
indicated that contractor reports were not routinely checked for accuracy or completion 
(Schwartz). In a 2007 report released by the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 
the State Department’s records were found in complete disarray preventing the group from 
“reaching any meaningful conclusions.” Stuart W. Bowen Jr., the special inspector general 
seeking the elimination of waste, fraud, and abuse in the $44.5 billion US reconstruction effort, 
explained that DS documents “were not in sufficient order for us to do an audit” and claimed that 
it could take three to five years to sort through the documents (Hedgpeth).  
The lack of documentation and accuracy of records prevented effective communication 
between the State Department and the Department of the Defense and resulted in a DoD 
initiative to correct State’s mishaps.20 Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates sought DOD control of 
all DS contractors, highlighting the State Department’s lack of communication with military 
officials and aggressive contractor behavior that interfered with military operations. Incidents 
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like the Blackwater shooting were setbacks for the DoD as these occurrences fostered more Iraqi 
hostility and undermined the US mission in Iraq. Negative feelings toward State Department 
contractors like Blackwater were easily transferred to DoD contractors who worked alongside 
DS personnel in some occasions. This initiative was resisted by Secretary of State Condoleezza 
Rice who ordered increased oversight by the State Department and better coordination between 
diplomatic and military officials on the ground (DeYoung).  The State Department’s inability to 
keep proper documentation posed a major threat to successful coordination with the Department 
of Defense. The lack of transparency prohibited any outside understanding of what the State 
Department was doing or how they were doing it.  
The State Department seemed to be losing control over the growing number of private 
security contractors it was outsourcing. With only 580 special agents providing security overseas 
at 159 US embassies, the State Department hired more PSCs to meet the expanding security 
operations (Eicher). From 2003 to 2007, the amount of money the State Department paid to 
private security and law enforcement contractors jumped from $1 billion a year to $4 billion 
(Broder).  The number of PSCs hired under the DS was growing exponentially, but who 
provided oversight of these contractors? Within the State Department’s Bureau of Diplomatic 
Security, DS agents known as Regional Security Officers (RSOs) managed all contract 
operations. Under the authority of the Chief of Mission, the RSO established protective security 
operation procedures, enforced the rules of engagement as established by the US Embassy 
policy, implemented training regimens and after action report procedures, and required standards 
of conduct for all PSCs (Eicher). Working with a staff of assistant RSOs, these individuals 
maintained contractor performance and quality. However, complaints from contracting officials 
within the State Department began to surface about a lack of oversight personnel. DS officials 
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complained that there were simply not enough people to oversee the 2,500 PSCs operating in 
Iraq. DS officials even suggested a mandatory contractor fee to pay for additional government 
officers, as only seventeen individuals handled billions of DS dollars for contracting (Broder). 
Secretary Rice formed a review panel led by Ambassador Patrick Kennedy to examine the State 
Department’s terms of management and policy procedures shortly after the Blackwater shooting. 
In the panel’s final report on October 23, 2007, 19 recommendations21 were made, one of which 
stated: “The Diplomatic Security Service does not have sufficient special agents worldwide to 
take on all personnel service operations in Iraq and meet requirements in other countries” 
(Elsea).  
 With pressure from the Department of Defense, the American public, and Iraqi civilians 
to respond to the State Department’s apparent lack of oversight, the US government had to act 
quickly to correct the State Department’s oversight problems. The US Congress immediately 
responded to the transparency and manpower problems by demanding better coordination 
between the DoD and DS. On December 5, 2007, Deputy Secretary of State John Negronponte 
and Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) 
for their departments regarding authority of PSCs operating in Iraq. This joint effort established 
core principles that regulated DoD and DS activity in providing oversight and accountability to 
PSCs working for them. The core standards required at a minimum proper management of and 
coordination of PSC operations, a clear legal basis for holding PSCs accountable, and joint 
efforts for investigation surrounding PSC conduct. The 2007 MOA defined the process for 
dispute resolution between the two departments and required the development a common 
database for DoD and DS officials to track accountability. The Government Accountability 
Office deemed this MOA successful in a 2008 report that concluded “both DOD and the State 
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Department have taken steps to increase staffing, oversight, and coordination over PSC, and that 
these steps may help reduce the number of PSC incidents in Iraq” (Elsea).  
 Following the improvement of DOD and DS coordination, a 2008 Status of Forces 
Agreement (SOFA) between the US and Iraq ended PSC immunity to Iraqi law. Eliminating the 
2004 CPA agreement that had directed contractors to be prosecuted in their home countries, the 
Iraqi government established jurisdiction over PSC activity. On January 1, 2009, the Embassy 
Baghdad issued a Reminder to Contractors Regarding Iraqi Jurisdiction22 explaining that 
“contractors operating in Iraq are now subject to Iraq civil and criminal law”.23 The Embassy 
reminder went on to explain that contractors who violate Iraqi law could be subject to the Iraqi 
criminal justice system as the “Government of Iraq has primary jurisdiction over offenses 
committed by USG contractors, even on bases and diplomatic properties”. The Embassy 
guaranteed a commitment to work with the Iraqi government to ensure that all contractors 
accused of a crime were treated fairly, but strongly encouraged all contractors to respect and 
abide by Iraqi law as many crimes punishable by imprisonment carried longer sentences under 
Iraqi law than US law (Embassy Baghdad).  
 Private security contractors in Iraq were, for the first time, performing security functions 
in a hostile environment. The State Department outsourced PSCs to make up for a shortage of 
special agents and as the number of DS contractors increased, the oversight provided did not 
keep pace. The Blackwater shooting in Baghdad uncovered a multitude of problems within the 
State Department including a significant lack of proper documentation, insufficient staff to 
oversee the contractors, and the legal gray zones that prohibited any type of accountability over 
PSC behavior. Once these mishaps surfaced,24 the State Department and Blackwater Worldwide 
came under heavy scrutiny from the media, the US government, and the Department of Defense. 
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Targeted as an enabler for contractor abuses, the State Department was forced to correct the 
issues within its administration, particularly coordination with the Department of Defense. 
Communication between the two agencies was crucial to the success of military and diplomatic 
missions as PSCs were, for the first time, performing security functions much different than the 
historic supportive function. With each agency working together to transport convoys and secure 
compounds, the State Department’s lack of oversight in adversely affected the mission of the 
DoD. Because DS contractors operated with virtually no accountability, Iraqi hostility toward 
these PSCs grew, further undermining the US mission in Iraq. Aggressive behavior from DS 
contractors, like Blackwater personnel, only added to Iraqi views that US contractors operated 
above the law. The 2009 establishment of Iraqi jurisdiction over PSCs in Iraq was a major step in 
eliminating the legal gray zones that State Department contractors had previously been operating 
under. By declaring Iraqi jurisdiction over these PSCs, accountability was finally established and 
power granted to the Iraqi government to hold PSCs accountable for actions that were once 
immune to any prosecution. It became apparent that the United States had failed to provide 
adequate oversight for State Department private security contractors in Iraq, though recent steps 
have improved this oversight. 
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Endnotes 
1
 Blackwater Worldwide was founded by Erik Prince in 1997 after he purchased 
thousands of acres of land in the North Carolina Great Dismal Swamp area. With a concern 
about a lack of training facilities, Prince sought to develop a facility that could successfully train 
the armed forces thus becoming a vital and profitable enterprise (DeFronzo).  
2 See Appendix A for a photo of Nisour Square.  
3
 See Appendix B for Chart of Civilian Participation in Conflict.  
4
 See Appendix C for Chart of Trends in Service Provided in Iraq.  
5
 See Appendix D for a chart of the Department of Defense Security Contractors in Iraq.  
6
 As of March 2005, the United States, Iraq, and international donors had pledged or 
made available more than $60 billion for security, governance, and reconstruction efforts in Iraq.  
The U.S. has completed projects in Iraq that have helped to restore basic services, such as 
rehabilitating oil wells and refineries, increasing electrical generation capacity, restoring water 
treatment plants, and reestablishing Iraqi basic health care services. “The U.S. effort to restore 
Iraq’s basic infrastructure and essential services is important to attaining U.S. military and 
political objectives in Iraq and helping Iraq achieve democracy and freedom” as described by a 
2005 Government Accountability Office report to Congress (Christoff).  
7
 WWPS contracts generally call for bodyguards and guards for infrastructure in Baghdad 
along with other areas throughout Iraq. The WWPS II contract in Iraq called for a five year, one 
year base and four optional years (Elsea).  
8
 See Appendix E for a chart of the Department of State Security Contractors in Iraq 
under WWPS contract.  
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9 Various acts of violence were unfolding throughout Iraq. On March 31, 2004 in 
Fallujah, four Blackwater employees were ambushed and killed by Iraqi civilians. According to 
Blackwater Worldwide, 32 employees had been killed and 46 wounded since March 1, 2004 in 
Iraq. Such incidents alarmed contractors and contributed to the animosity between US personnel 
and Iraqi civilians (Elsea).  
10 See Appendix F for photo of Baghdad following a day of violent attacks.  
11 See Appendix G for Map of Baghdad including Green Zone.  
12 On September 16, 2007, three black GMC Suburbans were traveling to the traffic circle 
at the center of Nisour Square. Within one of the vehicles sat Kerry Pelzman, a USAID specialist 
on helping rebuild Iraqi businesses, schools, and other infrastructure. Blackwater gun trucks, 
known as Mambas, operated by five Blackwater personnel were each mounted at the front and 
rear. She was on her way to a meeting to discuss Izdihar- a joint venture company that was 
working on rebuilding Iraq’s badly damaged infrastructure with funding from USAID on a three-
year contract. The meeting’s location was approximately two miles from the nearest Green Zone, 
or secured compound. Within minutes, she was transported to her destination. At about noon, a 
car bomb exploded. Plezman was hustled back into her vehicle and as her convoy departed, the 
shooting continued (Piecing Together Blackwater).  
13
 Representative Tom Davis, in his opening statement to Congress at the Hearing of 
House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, went on to say that the Blackwater 
incident would spark additional resentment and attacks on private security contractors, “a force 
even the Iraqi government concedes is still a vital layer of security” (Elsea).  
14 See Appendix H for Policy Directives for Armed Private Security Contractors in Iraq 
language. 
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15 The Policy Directive for Armed Private Security Contractors in Iraq was issued in 
accordance with the Embassy Baghdad’s initial Mission Firearms Policy that was adopted under 
the WPPS contract. The Mission Firearms Policy calls for adherence with the State Department’s 
“paramount value for all human life” and an “escalation of force” procedure. Personnel should 
take all reasonable steps possible to prevent the use of deadly force unless there is no safe 
alternative (Griffin). 
16
 A seven step procedure details the policy for escalation of force beginning with (1) 
English/Arabic visual warning signs on vehicles; (2) hand/verbal warning signs; (3) use of bright 
lights; (4) use of Pen flares; (5) weapon pointed at offending vehicle; (6) shots fired into engine 
block of vehicle; (7) shots fired into windshield of vehicle (Griffin).  
17 Congress approved the MEJA to sign into law on 22 November 2000. Its purpose was 
to close a jurisdictional "gap that allows individuals accompanying our military personnel 
overseas to go unpunished for heinous crimes." Because civilians accompanying the military 
overseas were not subject to military jurisdiction unless during time of war and most federal 
criminal statutes do not apply outside the territory of the United States or the special maritime 
jurisdiction of the United States, civilians who committed crimes overseas could only be 
subjected to prosecution by the nation where the crime occurred. In some cases, the host country 
refused to prosecute, especially in cases of an offense against a fellow American. The MEJA 
expanded federal jurisdiction of the United States over civilians accompanying the military 
overseas to correct these instances (Harder). 
18 Unlike the State Department, the Department of Defense has a clear protocol for 
addressing contractor abuses. Both the MEJA and the UCMJ allowed for DoD prosecution of 
PSCs. The military chain of command enforces the rules and has procedures to follow if an 
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incident occurs. DoD personnel report contractor abuses to the Inspector General, who leads an 
investigation into the issue following coordination with the Department of Justice. In 2008, the 
Army initiated a court-martial of a civilian contractor, Alaa Mohammed Ali. Ali was a Canadian-
Iraqi citizen working as an interpreter on a DoD contract charged with stabbing a fellow 
contractor at a U.S. military base in Iraq. In June 2008, Ali pled guilty and was sentenced to five 
months imprisonment (Schwartz). 
19
 Paul Bremer, head of the CPA, signed Coalition Provisional Authority Order 17 where 
it is stated that: 
Contractors shall not be subject to Iraqi laws or regulations in matters relating to the 
 terms and conditions of their Contracts, including licensing and registering employees, 
 businesses and corporations; provided, however, that Contractors shall comply with such 
 applicable licensing and registration laws and regulations if engaging in business or 
 transactions in Iraq other than Contracts. Notwithstanding any provisions in this Order, 
 Private Security Companies and their employees operating in Iraq must comply with all 
 CPA Orders, Regulations, Memoranda, and any implementing instructions or regulations 
 governing the existence and activities of Private Security Companies in Iraq, including 
 registration and licensing of weapons and firearms. The PSCAI, the association of 
 security companies based in Iraq, advises its members on these matters. It is headed up 
 by a former Marine, Lawrence Peter (Griffin).  
20 The relationship between DS and DoD became very tense following the Blackwater 
incident. Prior to this, the two agencies maintained minimal coordination only when their paths 
crossed. Following the incident, stronger coordination between the two was part of a 
Congressionally mandated effort to improve oversight. Since 2007, this coordination has 
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significantly recovered. DS officials coordinate any PSC movements with DoD through liaison 
officers and provide a daily briefing to the Iraqi government on any upcoming PSC activities 
(Solis). 
21 Other noteworthy recommendations from the panel included amendments to the State 
Department’s WPPS II contract that would tighten rules concerning use of deadly force, an 
increase in DS special agents to Baghdad to escort any and all convoys leaving Green Zones, the 
dismissal of DOD takeover of DS operations, and the establishment of a permanent working 
group between the Regional Security Office and Iraqi forces that would agree on operational 
procedures and encourage the exchange of ideas (Elsea).  
 
22 See Appendix I for Text from Embassy Baghdad Reminder to Contractors Regarding 
Iraqi Jurisdiction.  
 
23
 Scholars agree that something must be done to hold PSCs accountable, though many 
believe Iraqi jurisdiction is not the answer. “Placing contractors at the mercy of an 
underdeveloped Iraqi legal system is not a solution”. Detrimental effects of this include 
weakened protections for PSCs and the resulting reliance on third country nationals who lack 
training to replace PSCs from the US when they realize that “the risks of being thrown in an Iraqi 
prison are not worth a paycheck” (Cohen).  
 
24 DynCorp was also under investigation for misuse of DS funds. Auditors were unable to 
track how funds were spent due to mismanaged paperwork and incomplete documentation. In a 
January audit of DynCorp’s work, inspector general Stuart W. Bowen, Jr. found that the DS paid 
$43.8 million for the manufacturing of a residential camp that had never been used. At the 
conclusion of Bowen’s report, officials had “no confidence that the government paid for only 
valid expenses under the contract” (Hedgpeth). 
